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UNITED STATES v. BRYANT: THE RESULTS OF 
UPHOLDING WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Madalynn Martin* 
Introduction 
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, a known women’s advocate, authored a 
unanimous opinion that ensured the rights and dignity of Indian women 
were upheld.1 United States v. Bryant, while primarily focused on the rights 
of Indian women, is equally as important in upholding the sovereignty of 
tribal courts. The Supreme Court held that, because tribal court convictions 
are valid under the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), federal courts can use 
previous tribal court convictions to enhance the sentencing of the defendant 
as a repeat offender.2 In tribal courts, there is no Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. Rather, most tribal courts are governed by ICRA which offers 
similar guarantees. The provision of ICRA regarding the right to counsel 
differs from the Sixth Amendment on when indigent defendants are offered 
counsel. Thus, several tribal court convictions would be invalid in state or 
federal court because the indigent defendant was not given defense counsel 
pursuant to constitutional standards. These uncounseled tribal court 
convictions are then used in federal court to convict Indian defendants as 
habitual offenders. In this case, although the defendant’s previous tribal 
court domestic violence conviction would have violated the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel provision in a federal or state court, it was a 
valid conviction under ICRA and was able to be used to convict the 
defendant as a domestic violence habitual offender.3 The Court’s decision 
upheld the rights of Indian women and tribal sovereignty, and showcased 
the difference in the right to counsel granted to Indian indigent tribal court 
defendants. 
This Note will analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Bryant and offer examples of various applications by both federal and state 
courts. Additionally, this Note will discuss the difficulties faced by tribal 
courts seeking to maintain autonomy over crimes committed in Indian 
                                                                                                                 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1958 (2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1958–59. 
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Country and the additional protections put in place for Indian women 
experiencing domestic violence. Part I will address the relevant law 
applicable to United States v. Bryant at the time of the decision. Part II will 
discuss the procedural history of Bryant in the Ninth Circuit, as well as the 
circuit split it created with the Eighth and Tenth Circuit. Part III will delve 
into the Supreme Court’s decision and Justice Thomas’ concurrence. Part 
IV will highlight the differing applications of the Bryant decision in federal 
and state court decisions. Part V will discuss the implications of this 
decision, including reasons why tribal courts defer to federal courts and 
what other protections are in place for Indian women in tribal courts. 
I. Relevant Law 
A. Right to Assistance of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment states that criminal defendants “have the [right to] 
Assistance of Counsel for [their] defence.”4 Specifically, the Sixth 
Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants 
anytime a sentence of imprisonment is imposed.5 The right to have counsel 
appointed for indigent defendants was not a requirement for states to 
provide until 1963, when the right to appointed counsel was held to be 
“fundamental and essential to a fair trial” in Gideon v. Wainwright.6 The 
right to counsel attaches at any “critical stage” of the criminal proceeding, 
which in federal court means the right attaches at a defendant’s 
arraignment.7 Further, in 1972, the Supreme Court specified that the right to 
counsel must be afforded to any indigent defendant charged with any 
offense that is punishable by a term of imprisonment.8 Thus, states must 
provide indigent defendants with counsel if they are being tried for a crime 
that includes the possibility of incarceration. 
Because the U.S. legal system is based upon the policy that everyone is 
innocent until proven guilty, this Sixth Amendment mandate ensures 
defendants who cannot afford counsel are still given a fair shot at 
maintaining that innocence.9 In Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court 
stated that even a smart man “[w]ithout [the assistance of counsel], though 
                                                                                                                 
 4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 5. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963). 
 6. Id. at 342. 
 7. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1970).  
 8. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
 9. Heather Baxter, Gideon’s Ghost: Providing the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
in Times of Budgetary Crisis, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REV. 341, 381. 
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he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not 
know how to establish his innocence.”10 This case reflects the view of a 
majority of Americans today who believe that “the quality of justice a 
person receives should not be determined by how much money he or she 
has.”11 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel remains a fundamental rule 
in our criminal justice system since its establishment in Gideon v. 
Wainwright. 
Although providing indigent defendants the assistance of counsel is 
required by the U.S. Constitution and is a driving ideal in America today, 
the logistics of providing defendants with this service has its challenges. 
Immediately after the Supreme Court decision to require states to provide 
counsel to indigent defendants, states struggled to implement this mandate 
and it has continued to create more issues within the criminal justice 
system.12 Specifically, government funding for public defenders is 
shockingly low, and any attempts to increase funding are often met with 
political resistance.13 These public defenders are also required to handle 
more cases than an effective assistance claim would allow.14 A 2017 study 
showed public defenders in Rhode Island should handle only about thirty-
six percent of their current caseload to provide reasonably effective 
assistance of counsel.15 More than fifty years after the monumental Gideon 
v. Wainwright decision requiring states to provide counsel for indigent 
defendants, the government still struggles to find the funding to guarantee a 
fair trial under this constitutional mandate. 
B. The 1968 Indian Civil Rights Act and the 2010 Tribal Law and Order 
Act 
While the United States Supreme Court has stressed the importance of 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, this constitutional ideal is not 
encompassed in tribal laws. In 1896, the Supreme Court held that tribal 
governments were not bound by the limitations of the U.S. Constitution.16 
The Court pointed out that “the Indian nations ha[ve] always been 
                                                                                                                 
 10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
 11. Baxter, supra note 9. 
 12. Id. at 348. 
 13. Robert E. Toone, The Absence of Agency in Indigent Defense, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
25, 53–54 (2015). 
 14. Baxter, supra note 9, at 355–57. 
 15. ABA & NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, THE RHODE ISLAND PROJECT: A 
STUDY OF THE RHODE ISLAND PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD 
STANDARDS 7 (2017). 
 16. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). 
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considered as distinct, independent political communities . . . .”17 
Additionally, the Constitution specifically states treaties already made with 
tribes are the “supreme law of the land.”18 In response to this holding, the 
Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) was fashioned in 1968 to give citizens 
under tribal jurisdiction the same or similar rights guaranteed in the Bill of 
Rights of the United States Constitution.19 Thus, unlike federal or state 
courts, tribal courts are constrained by ICRA and not the U.S. 
Constitution.20 ICRA received mixed reviews from tribes.21 While some 
tribes have incorporated ICRA entirely into their tribal constitutions, ICRA 
has not been transferred into many tribal constitutions, and others have 
chosen to adapt ICRA provisions through the tribe’s own cultural lens.22 
The reason ICRA has not been fully implemented is because ICRA is seen 
by some as an attack on traditional culture and meant to force tribes to 
assimilate to western legal norms.23 
In 2010, President Obama signed into law the Tribal Law and Order Act 
(TLOA), which amended ICRA and reformed the tribal criminal justice 
system.24 The purpose of TLOA was “to clarify governmental 
responsibilities regarding crimes in Indian Country; increase and improve 
collaboration among jurisdictions; support tribal self-governance and 
jurisdiction; . . . [and] combat crimes such as domestic violence [and] 
sexual assault . . . .”25 Under TLOA, tribal courts now have the ability to 
impose felony-level offenses, which include “sentences of up to three years 
per count and up to nine years per case . . . .”26 Before TLOA, tribal courts 
could only sentence defendants up to one year imprisonment.27 Like ICRA, 
many tribes have yet to incorporate TLOA into their criminal codes.28 In a 
                                                                                                                 
 17. Id. at 383 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Casey Douma, 40th Anniversary of the Indian Civil Rights Act: Finding a Way Back 
to Indigenous Justice, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2008, at 34, 34. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 35. 
 23. Id. at 34. 
 24. Christopher B. Chaney, The Promise of the Tribal Law and Order Act, FED. LAW., 
Mar./Apr. 2011, at 44, 44. 
 25. MICHELLE RIVARD PARKS, TRIBAL JUDICIAL INST., TRIBAL LAW AND ORDER ACT: 
ENHANCED SENTENCING AUTHORITY 2 (2015). 
 26. Chaney, supra note 24, at 46. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Seth J. Fortin, The Two-Tiered Program of the Tribal Law and Order Act, 61 
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 88, 94 (2013). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss1/5
No. 1] NOTES 121 
 
 
2012 report on TLOA, only sixty-four percent of selected tribes 
implemented about half the provisions necessary for enhanced sentencing 
and had trouble implementing the rest.29 Thus, for many tribes, the earlier 
ICRA provisions are still governing law. 
At first glance, it appears the provisions of ICRA and the Bill of Rights 
are coextensive, but several provisions, including the right to counsel, are 
slightly different. The ICRA provision regarding the right to counsel states 
that in “a criminal proceeding in which an Indian tribe . . . imposes a total 
term of imprisonment of more than 1 year on a defendant, the Indian tribe 
shall . . . at the expense of the tribal government, provide an indigent 
defendant the assistance of a defense attorney . . . .”30 Even though ICRA is 
recognized as a similar, modified version of the Bill of Rights, there is no 
right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants in tribal court if the 
sentence imposed is less than one year.31 Thus, the ICRA provision about 
the right to counsel is not equivalent to the Sixth Amendment right because 
the Court has interpreted the constitutional right to attach anytime a 
sentence of imprisonment could be imposed. 
C. Domestic Assault Habitual Offender Statute 
In United States v. Bryant, the defendant was charged in federal court 
with being a domestic assault habitual offender.32 Habitual offenders, or 
those who have been previously charged with domestic assault, are given 
harsher punishment than first- or second-time offenses in an attempt to 
combat recidivism for sexual offenders.33 The domestic assault habitual 
offender statute, referred to as § 117(a), includes  
[a]ny person who commits a domestic assault within . . . Indian 
country and who has a final conviction on at least 2 separate 
prior occasions in Federal, State, or Indian tribal court 
proceedings for offenses that would be, if subject to Federal 
jurisdiction[,] 
 . . . assault . . . against a spouse or intimate partner . . . .34 
The punishment for a domestic assault habitual offender is a sentence of 
imprisonment for up to five years unless the domestic assault includes 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 99. 
 30. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012). 
 31. Id. 
 32. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (2016). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2018). 
 34. Id.  
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substantial bodily injury, then the offender is potentially subject to a ten-
year sentence.35 This statute was created by the passage of the 2005 
Violence Against Women Act targeting serial domestic abuse offenders 
because of a statistically high recidivism rate among domestic abusers.36 In 
the creation of this habitual offender statute, lawmakers specifically 
included the ability to use Indian tribal court proceedings for the predicate 
offense.37 Before this domestic assault habitual offender statute, abusers in 
Indian Country could not be tried in federal court unless the abuse resulted 
in serious bodily injury or death.38 Additionally, tribal courts could not 
punish repeat abusers to sentences above one-year incarceration prior to the 
enactment of the 2010 TLOA.39 A one year sentence is considered 
“insufficient to deter repeated and escalating abuse.”40 Although advanced 
punishment is now available for tribes under TLOA, many have yet to 
adopt TLOA and still rely on the Federal Government and § 117(a) to 
convict defendants with a lengthier sentence.41 
D. Enhanced Sentencing and Invalid Prior Convictions 
The use of prior convictions to enhance sentencing raised concerns; 
specifically, whether the prior convictions used are valid and whether the 
defendant is being punished for the prior convictions. In Burgett v. Texas, 
the Supreme Court held when a prior conviction is obtained in violation of 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel, that conviction cannot be used to 
support guilt or enhance punishment for a later offense.42 The use of the 
prior conviction would only create “anew” a Sixth Amendment violation in 
any subsequent convictions of the defendant.43 Thus, any invalid conviction 
cannot be used to punish habitual offenders. Additionally, in Nichols v. 
United States, the Supreme Court specified that a sentence enhancement 
due to a prior conviction is not punishment for the prior conviction, but it is 
a punishment only for the current conviction being charged.44 In Nichols, 
the defendant’s guilty plea to a DUI offense was used to enhance his 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id.  
 36. NAT’L CONG. OF AMERICAN INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION FIVE-YEAR REPORT 15 n.xiv (2018). 
 37. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. at 1961. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. See Fortin, supra note 28, at 90–91. 
 42. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994). 
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sentencing for a later offense.45 Because the DUI offense was a 
misdemeanor subject to a fine—and not a term of imprisonment—the 
defendant did not have a constitutional right to counsel for that trial.46 
While this conviction was uncounseled, the conviction was not obtained in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment.47 Accordingly, the Court held that the 
uncounseled prior conviction may be used to enhance sentencing.48 Using 
valid previous convictions to enhance punishment in sentencing is not 
punishment for past convictions.49 Indeed, “100% of the punishment is for 
the offense of the conviction. None is for the prior convictions or the 
defendant's ‘status as a recidivist.’”50 Thus, a valid prior conviction, 
whether counseled or not, is necessary to enhance sentencing for the current 
offense.51 
E. Doctrine of Comity 
To be able to use tribal court convictions, courts refer to the doctrine of 
comity. Comity “is a balancing act between recognizing the legislative, 
executive and judicial acts of other nations and the rights of citizens of the 
recognizing countries.”52 It is “based on the notion of respect for the ability 
of another nation to govern its own affairs and to regulate events there.”53 
For Indian tribes, comity “has been chiefly concerned with ensuring tribal 
court remedies are exhausted before federal courts become involved.”54 
Further, the doctrine of comity reasons that courts should “as a matter of 
discretion rather than obligation defer to the assertion of jurisdiction or give 
effect to the judgments of other states or sovereigns out of mutual respect, 
and for the purpose of furthering the orderly administration of justice.”55 
Comity is also concerned with prior tribal court convictions since tribes are 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Id. at 740. 
 46. Id. at 743 (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)). 
 47. Id. at 746. 
 48. Id. at 746–47. 
 49. Id. at 747. 
 50. United States v. Rodriguez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Samuel D. Newton, Note, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The 
Constitutionality of Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal 
Trials After Ant, Cavanaugh, and Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489, 501 (2011–2012). 
 53. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.07(2)(a) (Nell Jessup Newton et 
al. eds., 2017). 
 54. Newton, supra note 52. 
 55. Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 236 Wis. 
2d 384, 405 (2000). 
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considered separate sovereigns.56 Respecting and recognizing tribal court 
convictions helps prevent “endless relitigation of issues.”57 The doctrine of 
comity allows for courts to have deferential preference toward recognizing 
prior tribal court convictions when relying on them in subsequent 
proceedings. 
II. Procedural and Factual History 
The facts in United States v. Bryant exemplify the problem of domestic 
violence in Indian Country. Michael Bryant Jr. is an enrolled member of the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribe and once resided on the reservation.58 During that 
time, Mr. Bryant had a record of over one hundred tribal court convictions, 
and at least five of those convictions were guilty pleas for domestic abuse.59 
For each of his domestic violence cases, the tribal court sentenced Mr. 
Bryant to terms of imprisonment of less than one year.60 Under ICRA, the 
Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court was not required to appoint Mr. Bryant 
counsel during his domestic violence convictions because the terms of 
imprisonment were less than one year.61 In 2011, Mr. Bryant was once 
again arrested within tribal jurisdiction for assaulting two different 
women.62 
This time, Mr. Bryant’s case was not brought to tribal court, but instead 
to federal district court where he was indicted by a grand jury as a domestic 
assault habitual offender under § 117(a).63 The court used Mr. Bryant’s five 
previous tribal court domestic violence convictions to charge him under § 
117(a).64 Finally receiving assistance of counsel, Mr. Bryant motioned the 
court to dismiss the habitual offender charge.65 He argued that using the 
tribal court convictions as a predicate offense violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel because his uncounseled tribal court 
convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if 
brought in state or federal court.66 The trial court denied the motion to 
                                                                                                                 
 56. Newton, supra note 52. 
 57. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 53, § 7.07(2)(a). 
 58. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1963 (2016). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 1963–64. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 1964.  
 66. Id. 
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dismiss the habitual offender charge, and Mr. Bryant consequently pleaded 
guilty, reserving the right to appeal the issue.67 Mr. Bryant was then 
sentenced as a habitual offender, and, with the help of counsel, appealed the 
district court’s ruling on the motion to dismiss to the Ninth Circuit.68 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court, 
relying on its previous decision in United States v. Ant.69 In Ant, the 
defendant wanted to suppress a prior guilty plea made in tribal court arising 
out of the same offense in federal court.70 The court focused on the 
reliability of the previous tribal court conviction.71 In Ant, the court decided 
the lack of assistance of counsel made the previous guilty plea unreliable to 
be used in federal courts.72 Using the precedent from Ant, the Ninth Circuit 
found the admissibility of the tribal court convictions valid only if Mr. 
Bryant was guaranteed the right to counsel coextensive with the Sixth 
Amendment.73 The court reasoned that Mr. Bryant’s prior convictions, if 
obtained in federal or state court, would have violated the Sixth 
Amendment because he was not offered counsel.74 As such, the Ninth 
Circuit held the government may not rely on Mr. Bryant’s tribal court 
convictions to charge him as a habitual offender because the convictions, 
while valid under ICRA, violate the right to counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment.75 This decision created a circuit split between the Ninth 
Circuit and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits. 
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Cavanaugh was “persuaded . . . 
that the predicate convictions, valid at their inception, and not alleged to be 
otherwise unreliable, may be used to prove the elements of § 117.”76 In this 
case, the defendant was charged in federal court with domestic violence by 
a habitual offender under § 117(a).77 The defendant’s prior convictions in 
tribal court were without the assistance of counsel and would have been in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment had they been in state or federal court 
because they resulted in incarceration.78 The district court had dismissed the 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 70. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1390 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 71. Newton, supra note 52, at 519. 
 72. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1395. 
 73. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677. 
 74. Id. at 673. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 643 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 77. Id. at 593. 
 78. Id. at 593–94. 
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habitual offender claims below because, although the tribal court 
convictions were valid, they would “give rise anew to a Sixth Amendment 
violation by imposing federal punishment.”79 The Eighth Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s holding.80 The appellate court reasoned that the use of the 
uncounseled tribal court conviction did not violate any Sixth Amendment 
guarantees because the punishment imposed in the current case is for the 
current offense only, not for the prior conviction.81 When contemplating 
whether the tribal court conviction was able to be used the Eighth Circuit 
noted that if it did make the decision to not uphold the validity of the tribal 
court conviction, this decision would not “restrict a tribe’s own use of that 
conviction; it would simply restrict a federal court’s ability to impose 
additional punishment at a later date in reliance on that earlier 
conviction.”82 Because the Sixth Amendment is not extended to tribal 
courts, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the defendant’s conviction was 
able to be used in subsequent federal proceedings.83 The court further 
buttressed this opinion by citing the doctrine of comity, acknowledging that 
deference must be given to the tribal court conviction out of respect for the 
sovereignty of tribal courts.84 
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Shavanaux upheld the use of the 
defendant’s prior uncounseled tribal court conviction in his federal court 
conviction to classify him as a domestic assault habitual offender under § 
117(a).85 The court concluded that the defendant’s tribal court conviction 
was not—and could not—be a violation of the Sixth Amendment because 
the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal jurisdiction.86 Moreover, a valid 
conviction cannot violate “anew” the Sixth Amendment in subsequent 
federal court proceedings.87 “[T]he practice of failing to fully recognize 
convictions from individual tribal courts also risks imposing inappropriately 
sweeping standards upon diverse tribal governments, institutions and 
cultures,” which undermines ICRA's objective of allowing tribes to adopt 
“their own tribal court[s] and criminal justice system[s].”88 Further, the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Id. at 595. 
 80. Id. at 603–04. 
 81. Id. at 599. 
 82. Id. at 605. 
 83. Id. at 603–04. 
 84. Id. at 605. 
 85. 647 F.3d 993, 1000 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 86. Id. at 999. 
 87. Id. at 998. 
 88. Id. at 1000 (citation omitted). 
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Tenth Circuit reasoned that upholding tribal convictions is similar to 
upholding the validity of using prior foreign offenses that do not comport 
with the Constitution.89 Under the principle of comity, the Tenth Circuit 
allowed the use of tribal court convictions in federal district court to 
enhance sentencing.90 
Both the Eighth Circuit and the Tenth Circuit based their holdings in 
Cavanaugh and Shavanaux on the notion that, because the convictions were 
brought in tribal court, and the Sixth Amendment does not apply, the 
convictions are valid if properly conducted under ICRA.91 Alternatively, the 
Ninth Circuit based its holding on the fact that the conviction would have 
been unconstitutional if brought in federal court and thus raised reliability 
issues.92 While there are Sixth Amendment concerns of reliability in 
Bryant, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, and instead 
chose to apply the Eighth and Tenth Circuit’s comity approach to prior 
tribal court convictions.93 
III. United States v. Bryant 
A. Issue and Holding 
The Ninth Circuit decision was granted certiorari by the Supreme Court 
to answer the question: “Is it permissible to use uncounseled tribal-court 
convictions—obtained in full compliance with ICRA—to establish the 
prior-crimes predicate of § 117(a)?”94 The Court held that it was 
permissible to use the defendant’s uncounseled tribal court convictions as a 
predicate offense for an enhanced sentence because these convictions did 
not violate ICRA or the Sixth Amendment.95 
B. Reasoning 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion starts by emphasizing the importance of this 
case for Native American women because, “compared to all other groups in 
the United States,” Native American women “experience the highest rates 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1001. 
 91. United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 2011). 
 92. United States v. Bryant, 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 93. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1964 (2016). 
 94. Id. at 1962. 
 95. Id. at 1958–59. 
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of domestic violence.”96 Specifically, § 117(a), the punishment provision 
for domestic violence habitual offenders, is important for Native American 
women because it helps deter and prevent recidivism of abusers in Indian 
Country.97 The facts in United States v. Bryant exemplify § 117(a)’s 
solution for recidivism because the defendant was brought into federal court 
as a habitual offender after multiple convictions for domestic assault in 
tribal court.98 
The Court relied on Nichols v. United States in its analysis and 
decision.99 The precedent set in Nichols provides that a valid conviction in 
any court can be used as a predicate offense for § 117(a).100 The defendant, 
Mr. Bryant, unsuccessfully argued that his case is distinctive from the 
defendant in Nichols v. United States, because he was actually imprisoned 
for his uncounseled tribal court convictions, unlike the defendant in Nichols 
who received a fine.101 Under this argument, the tribal court conviction 
would be a violation of the Sixth Amendment if Mr. Bryant had been tried 
and convicted in state or federal court and, thus, it creates “anew” a Sixth 
Amendment violation in federal courts.102 Mr. Bryant conceded that all of 
his previous tribal court convictions were valid under ICRA, but still 
maintained that they could not be used as a predicate offense under § 
117(a).103 The Court held the uncounseled tribal court conviction could be 
used regardless of whether the previous conviction would violate the rules 
of the present court.104 Pursuant to the conclusion in Nichols that repeat 
offender laws do not punish the previous crime, the previous conviction 
need only be a valid state, federal, or tribal conviction to be used under § 
117(a).105 
The Court further relied on the doctrine of comity when discussing the 
reliability of tribal court convictions governed by ICRA.106 Although lack 
of counsel when subject to a term of imprisonment would violate the Sixth 
Amendment, the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal courts.107 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. at 1959 (quoting 151st CONG. REC. 9061 (2005) (remarks of Sen. McCain)). 
 97. Id. at 1960. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1963. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1962. 
 103. Id. at 1964. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1966. 
 107. Id. at 1964. 
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Rather, ICRA is the governing law to control the validity of the tribal court 
conviction. As such, the holding in Burgett, that using a prior conviction 
that violates the Sixth Amendment would create “anew” another Sixth 
Amendment violation, is not applicable to Mr. Bryant because there was no 
initial violation.108 Accordingly, the tribal court predicate offense cannot 
create “anew” a Sixth Amendment violation if the prior conviction is 
governed by ICRA and not the Sixth Amendment.109 Additionally, the 
Court acknowledged there is no reason to suppose that tribal court 
convictions are less reliable or cannot be used as a predicate offense in 
federal court if they result in imprisonment rather than a fine.110 
In addition to the Sixth Amendment claim, Mr. Bryant invoked a Fifth 
Amendment due process claim.111 The due process claim was an attempt to 
preclude using any tribal court conviction as a predicate offense in federal 
court because using that conviction does not afford the same due process of 
law that the Constitution requires.112 This argument was rejected by the 
Court because ICRA guarantees defendants due process of law, even if the 
ICRA provision is different than the corresponding constitutional 
guarantee.113 The Court supported this by reasoning that ICRA additionally 
provides procedural safeguards by allowing defendants to appeal the 
decisions of the tribal court in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, which 
offers the defendant adequate due process of the law.114 
C. Justice Thomas’ Concurrence 
Justice Thomas joined the majority only because precedent cases dictate 
this holding.115 But, Justice Thomas disagreed with the decision of the 
Court to uphold the use of the tribal court conviction as a prior offense in a 
subsequent trial, because he saw no constitutional backing for the previous 
decisions that gave rise to the current decision.116 Justice Thomas outlined 
the three premises upon which this holding relied.117 First, the holding 
relied on the fact that the Sixth Amendment restricts any use of prior 
convictions that are invalid because they were not obtained pursuant to the 
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Sixth Amendment.118 Second, the holding also was grounded on the fact 
that tribes are sovereign and are not bound to the terms of the U.S. 
Constitution.119 Third, the holding also focused on Congress’s power to 
“punish assaults that tribal members commit against each other on Indian 
land.”120 
Regarding the first premise, Justice Thomas asked the Court to 
reconsider Burgett’s bar on using convictions in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment for predicate offenses because they would give rise “anew” to 
a Sixth Amendment violation in the current case.121 To Justice Thomas, the 
text of the Sixth Amendment should only guarantee the right to assistance 
of counsel for the current proceeding and thus, be able to use invalid prior 
convictions as predicate offenses.122 For the second and third premise, 
Justice Thomas commented on the contradiction that tribes are not 
constrained to follow the Constitution because they are sovereign, but Mr. 
Bryant is able to be federally prosecuted for a crime that should only be 
able to be brought in tribal court because Congress is endowed with “power 
over all aspects of tribal sovereignty.”123 Thus, even though tribes are 
allowed to set up their court systems without regard for the enumerated 
constitutional provisions, Congress can limit and “second guess” the ability 
of the tribal courts, and choose to punish certain Indian crimes in federal 
court.124 Justice Thomas “continue[s] to doubt” whether complete tribal 
sovereignty or Congress’ dominion over tribal court is the correct way to 
view tribal sovereignty, and acknowledges that the U.S. Constitution does 
not give any guidance to the issue.125 
IV. Applications 
Because tribal court convictions can apply beyond tribal jurisdiction, 
there are further implications from the holding in Bryant than main issue of 
Indian indigent defendants not being afforded the right to counsel. As such, 
it is helpful to review how different courts have applied Bryant in an array 
of circumstances. As the following cases will show, Bryant has been used 
to uphold the application of several tribal convictions beyond tribal 
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jurisdiction. For example, the holding from Bryant was applied to a 
defendant who plead guilty to child molestation in tribal court without 
counsel and failed to register as a sex offender outside of tribal 
jurisdiction.126 Additionally, it has been upheld where the defendant was 
given the assistance of lay counsel instead of a licensed attorney.127 Further, 
Bryant has been applied where the defendant invoked a Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel in tribal jurisdiction, but it did not attach until the case was 
brought for arraignment in federal court.128 Finally, Bryant has been applied 
to a decision where the defendant claimed his Fifth Amendment due 
process right was violated at the prior tribal court conviction.129 
A. Sex Offender Registration 
A similar application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant is the 
Arizona Court of Appeals decision in State v. Lopez.130 In this case, the 
defendant pleaded guilty—without the assistance of counsel—in tribal court 
to child molestation and was sentenced to less than a year imprisonment.131 
Thus, this was a valid tribal court conviction under ICRA. After the 
defendant’s release, he was charged by the state for failing to register as a 
sex offender.132 The defendant then challenged this claim as 
unconstitutional because it was based on an uncounseled tribal court 
conviction.133 Initially, the state court could not use the uncounseled tribal 
court conviction because the court was subject to the Ninth Circuit’s 
original holding in United States v. Bryant.134 When the Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Bryant, the Arizona Court of 
Appeals reversed its decision.135 The Arizona Court of Appeals held the 
tribal court conviction can show failure to register as long as the provisions 
of ICRA were followed in the prior conviction.136 
Bryant’s application in State v. Lopez is a primary example of how the 
decision in Bryant can harm a defendant that might not realize the full 
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effect of his uncounseled guilty plea outside of tribal jurisdiction. In this 
case, the defendant was not offered assistance of counsel in tribal court, but 
he would have been offered that assistance if the case was brought in state 
or federal court. The defendant was not offered the same rights as those 
given in the jurisdiction that the conviction was then applied. While the 
Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of comity necessitates this result, 
there are consequences to indigent tribal defendants who are not offered the 
same rights as defendants in state or federal court. 
B. Assistance of Lay Counsel 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant was applied in reference to a 
defendant’s claim that he had not been given proper assistance of counsel in 
tribal court. In United States v. Long, the defendant was charged in federal 
court with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, which 
requires a finding of a predicate offense.137 The predicate offense used was 
the defendant’s previous Rosebud tribal court conviction, which resulted in 
sentencing more than a year of incarceration.138 According to ICRA, the 
defendant was given right to counsel in the tribal court because he was 
indigent and his sentencing was for a period greater than a year.139 The 
Eighth Circuit reasoned “any right that Long had to appointed counsel 
could have come only from Rosebud tribal law.”140 Under Rosebud tribal 
law, lay counsel, instead of licensed attorneys, can be chosen to represent 
indigent defendants.141 Rosebud tribal court did not appoint an attorney to 
represent the defendant; rather, he was appointed a lay person to represent 
him in his tribal court case.142 Because Bryant affirmed that the Sixth 
Amendment does not apply to tribal courts, as long as the prior conviction 
was valid under Rosebud tribal law, it was also valid to use as a predicate 
offense.143 
There are no provisions under ICRA requiring that the counsel chosen to 
represent the indigent defendant be effective or a licensed attorney.144 Many 
tribal courts use lay counsel to represent indigent defendants so long as they 
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are licensed to practice in tribal court.145 TLOA added a provision that 
requires tribes to grant defendants the right to effective assistance of 
counsel “at least equivalent to that guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”146 
Also under TLOA, “if the defendant is indigent, an ‘attorney,’ licensed by a 
jurisdiction whose standards ensure ‘competence and professional 
responsibility,’ must be provided at the tribe's expense.”147 Consequently, if 
the tribe adopts the enhanced sentencing of TLOA, then they must also 
adopt the guarantees of effective assistance by a licensed attorney.148 While 
the provision is not specific as to what constitutes effective assistance, 
courts will likely follow the constitutional standard for effective 
assistance.149 The defendant’s prior tribal conviction in Long was not 
governed by the new provisions of the TLOA.150 Thus, lay counsel was 
allowed to represent the defendant in tribal court. 
The TLOA provision regarding effective assistance is seen by some as 
further assimilating tribes into Western legal culture and that lay counsel 
may actually be better trained in tribal common law and understandings of 
tribal legal culture than licensed attorneys.151 Further, many tribes are not 
able to incorporate TLOA because of the cost of maintaining full defense 
counsel for indigent defendants.152 Given that not all tribes have adopted 
TLOA, many tribes likely have convictions similar to the prior conviction 
in Long. Thus, Long illustrates the potential use of prior lay counseled tribal 
convictions in subsequent proceedings for tribes not under TLOA. 
C. When Right to Counsel Attaches 
Because of dual sovereignty, tribal courts and federal courts can bring 
the same or similar charge in both jurisdictions, but the Sixth Amendment 
right to assistance of counsel will only attach in federal court. In United 
States v. Mahkimetas, the defendant was arraigned in tribal court.153 As 
mentioned previously, if this case was brought in federal jurisdiction, the 
right to counsel would attach at the defendant’s arraignment. During a tribal 
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investigation following the tribal court arraignment, the defendant asked to 
invoke his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.154 The investigators stopped 
their questioning, but later a federal district court picked up the case and the 
same investigators again initiated questioning during travel to the federal 
court arraignment.155 The defendant argued that his Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel was invoked when he asked for counsel following the tribal court 
arraignment.156 Thus, his rights were violated when the investigators 
initiated questioning without counsel present because he had invoked the 
right after the tribal court arraignment.157 
The Seventh Circuit held that there was not a Sixth Amendment 
violation partially because of Bryant’s holding that the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel does not apply in tribal courts.158 Thus, the right to counsel 
did not attach at a tribal court proceeding because the tribal code did not 
offer the defendant the right to appointed counsel, and the defendant did not 
make any indication that he was going to hire counsel at his own 
expense.159 The court reasoned that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel would only attach after the federal court arraignment.160 
Given that federal courts and tribal courts are separate sovereigns and the 
defendant can be charged for the same crime in both court systems, the time 
in which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches is difficult for 
defendants to understand. This case provides notice to tribes to caution and 
inform defendants of the difference in laws from tribal court to federal 
courts. Many defendants likely do not understand rules that are applicable 
to the federal court system through the Constitution are not necessarily 
applicable to tribes. Further, defendants need to be informed that rights 
invoked in tribal court will not follow them into federal court, even if it is 
the same or a similar charge. 
D. Fifth Amendment Due Process Guarantee 
The Supreme Court touched on the Fifth Amendment due process right 
in Bryant, concluding that tribal court convictions do not inherently violate 
due process rights because ICRA still guarantees the defendant these rights. 
The federal district of South Dakota similarly applied this rule in United 
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States v. Gillette.161 The defendant in Gillette argued that his guilty plea in 
tribal court was a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process right.162 
The defendant argued that the court did not establish a factual basis for his 
admission of guilt and the court did not inform the defendant of the charge 
in court before pleading guilty.163 The South Dakota court used the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bryant to reason that ICRA, not the Fifth 
Amendment, governs tribal court.164 The provisions of ICRA guarantee 
defendants the due process of law.165 Courts are silent as to whether this 
due process guarantee should be interpreted the same as the constitutional 
guarantee.166 
As to the factual basis claim, the court reasoned due process does not 
require the finding of a factual basis.167 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11 requires the finding of a factual basis for a guilty plea.168 Since ICRA 
only incorporates a due process rule and does not incorporate the federal 
rules, there was no requirement for a finding of a factual basis for guilt.169 
Further, the defendant claimed that he was not read his charge in court 
before pleading guilty, but the court found that there was a trial transcript of 
the defendant’s attorney reading the charge to the defendant before the plea 
was given.170 Thus, the defendant’s ICRA due process right was not 
violated. 
The South Dakota court did not decide whether the due process right of 
ICRA should be interpreted in the same way as the Fifth Amendment 
right.171 While there cannot be a Fifth Amendment violation made in tribal 
court, courts interpret due process violations using Fifth Amendment court 
opinions because of the similarity of the ICRA guarantee.172 It cannot be 
assumed that “in the limited circumstances in which federal courts now 
apply [ICRA], the guarantees of [ICRA] will be enforced in exactly the 
same way as their counterparts in the Constitution.”173 While the Fifth 
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Amendment due process of law is not applied to the tribes, a federal court 
could use Fifth Amendment precedent to make its decision because of its 
similarities with the due process guarantee of ICRA and the court’s 
familiarity with constitutional due process. While the court in Gillette 
explicitly stated that it did not make a decision on whether to apply the due 
process clause of ICRA in the same manner as the Fifth Amendment, its 
analysis of the defendant’s claim that the court did not give him notice of 
his charges was analyzed with Fifth Amendment due process precedent 
cases.174 Gillette is an example of a court using constitutional case 
precedent to interpret a constitutionally similar ICRA provision. 
V. Implications 
As the above cases illustrate, there are various ways in which courts have 
applied the Bryant decision. All of the cases mentioned above limit the 
rights of the defendant. While the rights of tribal defendants are more 
limited than the rights given to federal or state court defendants under the 
Constitution, the somewhat more limited guarantees of ICRA must be 
upheld because tribes are sovereign. While the doctrine of comity allows 
for courts to interpret the reliability of other sovereign’s convictions, Bryant 
supports the idea that upholding tribal court decisions is more important. 
The Bryant decision did not question ICRA’s law or its guarantees of 
rights, but rather applied ICRA to the tribal case and did not entertain the 
idea that the conviction could be reopened and argued. While potentially 
limiting the rights of indigent defendants, ICRA is the guideline for what 
tribal courts must offer tribal court defendants. Thus, any ICRA-governed 
valid tribal court conviction will be upheld in a Constitution-governed U.S. 
system. 
A. Funding for Tribal Courts and the Implementation of the Tribal Law and 
Order Act 
The reason that ICRA does not guarantee defendants the right to counsel 
equivalent to the Constitution is predominantly due to funding.175 As 
mentioned previously, many tribes use lay counsel because retaining full 
defense counsel is expensive. Moreover, many tribes have not implemented 
TLOA primarily because of the lack of funding to provide counsel to 
indigent defendants.176 Resources for tribes is a top concern.177 At a recent 
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roundtable before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, funding was 
repeatedly mentioned as the primary hindrance for tribes trying to 
implement TLOA.178 One participant of the roundtable lamented that “[the 
Tribal Law and Order Act] failed to introduce the financial resources to 
become effective . . .” and that “[the tribe] need[s] additional, recurring 
funding [to provide more defense counsel].” Another participant pointed 
out that “[t]here is not as much money for indigent [defense] as there is for 
prosecution.”179 With the lack of funding, many tribes cannot afford to 
implement TLOA’s additional rights to indigent defendants. Thus, many 
indigent defendants are still not offered assistance of counsel even when 
subject to imprisonment. 
Although funding is an issue, the implementation of TLOA is a positive 
resolution to sovereignty issues. TLOA gives tribes the ability to stop 
relying on the federal government to punish recidivism and it provides 
guidelines for communication between the federal government and tribes. 
As mentioned previously, if tribes implement TLOA, they are able to 
punish Indian defendants for more than a year imprisonment. Consequently, 
TLOA allows tribal courts to enhance punishment on repeat offenders in 
tribal courts, rather than relying on federal courts and § 117(a) to prevent 
recidivism. Thus, tribes that have implemented TLOA can use their own 
resources to combat recidivism instead of relying on the federal system. 
The federal government can be selective when deciding which tribal cases 
to bring into the federal court system. Having the ability to punish domestic 
assault repeat offenders with harsher punishment allows tribes to retain 
more autonomy and ensure justice has been carried out in a way consistent 
with the traditions of the tribe. Beyond the ability to sentence repeat 
offenders in tribal court, TLOA also established guidelines for improved 
communication between tribes and the United States Attorney’s Office. 
This is meant to ensure that tribal cases are not being overlooked in federal 
court. This open communication policy helps tribes influence the conviction 
and punishment of Indian defendants in federal court. Thus, the 
implementation of TLOA is beneficial to tribal autonomy, whether the 
Indian defendant is being tried in federal court under § 117(a) or tribal 
court. 
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Through the adoption of TLOA, Indian indigent defendants are 
guaranteed more rights than under the previous ICRA provisions. Although 
tribes are adopting the TLOA into their respective criminal codes, funding 
keeps many still relying on federal courts to punish recidivism for domestic 
violence. The problem of domestic violence towards Indian women has 
been the focus of many statutes, but tribes are not able to implement them 
because of the lack of funding. While there are many resources available to 
help tribes implement TLOA, there should be additional resources for 
Indian indigent defendants to understand how their tribal court conviction 
can be upheld outside of tribal jurisdiction. 
B. The Violence Against Women Act’s Expansion of Jurisdiction to Non-
Indians 
TLOA works with the Violence Against Women Act to deter and punish 
domestic assault on Indian women. Indian women experience the highest 
rates of domestic violence in the United States and the majority of domestic 
violence offenses in Indian Country are committed by non-Indians.180 
Under Title IX of the 2013 Violence Against Women Act, tribal courts 
have jurisdiction of non-Indian perpetrators that do harm to Indian 
victims.181 Unlike Indian defendants, a non-Indian indigent defendant being 
tried in tribal court is entitled to bar-licensed court-appointed counsel if the 
defendant is exposed to a term of incarceration at any length.182 This 
“exposed to” rule is different from the Sixth Amendment because 
defendants are granted assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment 
only if they are subject to actual incarceration, not merely “exposed to” a 
possibility of incarceration.183 
Many bills have been introduced since the creation of the Violence 
Against Women Act to expand the types of violent crimes committed by 
non-Indian defendants that fall into tribal court jurisdiction, but all have yet 
to pass.184 Expanding jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants for the 
purposes of deterring violence against Indian women will allow the tribal 
courts to control who gets punished for crimes in Indian Country without 
relying on the federal court system. 
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The Tribal Law and Order Act and the Violence Against Women Act 
allow tribal courts to keep punishment within their jurisdiction rather than 
relying on the federal courts to punish crimes that strongly affect tribes. 
Tribes are able to take a strong approach toward the violence committed 
against Native women from both Indians and non-Indians. These two 
approaches differ in that the Indian indigent defendant is not guaranteed the 
same right to counsel as the non-Indian indigent defendant. As tribes and 
the federal government continue to work together to deter and punish 
domestic violence habitual offenders in Indian Country, the rights of the 
Indian indigent defendants need to be explained and understood by tribal 
court defense attorneys and advocates who seek to prevent injustice toward 
Indian defendants.  
Conclusion 
The differences between ICRA and constitutional provisions such as the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the usage of ICRA governed tribal 
court convictions to enhance punishment, exhibit the unique sovereignty 
issues of the tribal courts. The decision in United States v. Bryant upheld 
the sovereignty of tribal courts and their ability to continue to use ICRA to 
convict Indian defendants. Additionally, this decision was applied in state 
and federal courts to uphold tribal court convictions and rules. For example, 
tribal court convictions and rules apply for sex offender registration, the 
assistance of lay counsel, when right to counsel attaches, and Fifth 
Amendment due process rights. The potential implications from the 
decision in United States v. Bryant include: the doctrine of comity; funding 
needed to implement TLOA in order to keep enhanced punishment 
sentencing within the discretion of the tribal courts; the protections afforded 
to non-Indian defendants under the Violence Against Women Act; and the 
charge to tribal courts to be cautious with indigent Indian defendants and 
potentially create more resources for Indian defendants to get more 
information on their rights inside and outside of tribal jurisdiction. While 
upholding tribal sovereignty and the rights of Indian women, United States 
v. Bryant demonstrates the lack of protection for Indian indigent defendants 
in tribal court and tribes’ lack of control over punishment of domestic 
assault habitual offenders. Tribal courts must both protect Indian women 
and safeguard essential rights for Indian indigent defendants. While 
seemingly in opposition, tribes have a great duty to protect all of their 
citizens, therefore, they are tasked with protecting both of these rights. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
